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by Robert C. Fellmeth and Julianne B. D'Angelo* 
Functional democracy. It doesn't happen automatically. It has prereq-uisites, including governmental de-
cisions made in public with advance no-
tice by officials who are known and visi-
ble. This provides a way for the citizenry 
to pass judgment on the performance of 
their public officials, both elected and ap-
pointed. It also allows citizens to be heard 
as decisions are made which affect their 
interests. 
Perhaps the most important protector 
of democracy is a set of statutes called 
"sunshine laws." In California, two of 
the most important sunshine statutes are 
the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act1 
(applying to state agencies) and the Ralph 
M. Brown Act2 (applying to local agen-
cies). Their elements are not complicat-
ed. Post your agenda in advance so those 
with some interest in what you are doing 
will know about it. Meet and make your 
decisions in public so what you do may 
be seen and reported. Most important-
use the public forum to test what you 
intend to do; find out what people think 
of it; refine it if need be. And don't try 
to evade the law. Accept it. Don't run, 
and don't hide. 
These are nice sentiments, but there 
are problems. These laws are not acti-
vated where individual officials are in a 
position to make decisions. For example, 
the Real Estate Commissioner, the Insur-
ance Commissioner, and other regulatory 
officials with substantial public execu-
tive, judicial, and legislative powers do 
not act in public because they are not 
multimember bodies required to "meet" 
in order to make decisions. They just 
"decide"-alone and in their offices. 
Only if a hearing is required by statute 
do they convene a public forum-for ex-
ample, the requirement of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act that rules of an 
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agency be adopted after public hearing 
(which is triggered only if the agency de-
cides to hold one or someone requests it 
in a timely fashion). 
But for state agencies guided by 
multimember bodies, the law applies to 
any meeting of the state body and most 
subsets thereof. 3 They cannot decide un-
less they meet, and any meeting must be 
public-which means it must be noticed 
in advance and may be attended and 
monitored. Fortunately, many important 
regulatory agencies are governed, or 
their decisions reviewed, by "boards" or 
"commissions" or other multimember 
bodies. So there is a public crucible for 
decisionmaking. 
The most troubling evasion of this 
seminal democratic protection occurs 
where it is avoided en toto based on the 
contention that although a multimember 
body is involved, a meeting does not 
"qualify" for the law's protection-usu-
ally because "not enough people are 
meeting" or "it's not really a meeting" 
or "this is just a committee thing-it will 
be brought up again later at a more for-
mal and complete proceeding." The in-
tent of the law is hardly actualized where 
the required public proceeding is a later 
charade of a prior decision made in pri-
vate. The real decision is not monitored 
when it is made; the opportunity for pub-
lic participation and consideration of 
outside views becomes a fraud. For this 
reason, the law has traditionally applied 
to all meetings where officials gather to-
gether and discuss anything relevant to 
their public responsibilities. It is not 
merely the final decision which is to be 
made in public-the discussion, the con-
sideration, the weighing and deliberation 
are to be in public. 
The Brown Act covering local agen-
cies is somewhat different than the 
Bagley-Keene Act applying to state 
agencies. For example, local agencies 
are required to reserve a portion of the 
meeting for general public comment4; 
state agencies are not. Further, the 
Brown Act now permits advisory com-
mittees of a local board or commission 
to meet and discuss public business in 
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private, so long as the advisory commit-
tee is composed of less than a quorum 
of the local board5-so no business may 
be transacted. This flexibility for local 
agencies is ill-advised for the reasons 
noted above. 
The Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act 
applying to state agencies does not con-
tain the provision exempting its applica-
tion where a meeting occurs with "less 
than a quorum." Rather, state agencies 
(and subsets of state agencies which sat-
isfy the definition of "state body") must 
meet in public under Government Code 
section 11123, unless their discussion 
concerns one of 26 enumerated exemp-
tions in Government Code section 11126. 
Unlike the Brown Act applying to local 
government, even advisory committees 
of state bodies must comply with the 
open meeting requirement where, as the 
Bagley-Keene Act explicitly provides, 
"three or more" officials are meeting.6 
The import of this distinction, requir-
ing state multirnember bodies-includ-
ing advisory bodies consisting of three 
or more persons-to meet in public 
under the Act, is momentous. State agen-
cies set the policy of the state as a whole 
across entire industry sectors. Their de-
cisions, above all, must not be made in 
a private setting. Note that unlike full-
time local governmental bodies, most 
state multimember boards consist of un-
paid persons meeting as full boards only 
once per month or less often. Further, 
unlike most local entities, state boards 
and commissions are frequently con-
trolled by persons from the very trade or 
industry being regulated by that board or 
commission. For the protection of the 
absent public, these officials-who do 
not necessarily live in the local commu-
nity of the public being affected by their 
decisions-especially need public visi-
bility and input. Finally, the application 
of the Brown Act's loophole would be 
especially pernicious in the state setting: 
An eleven-member commission with a 
six-person quorum could delegate its 
business to four- or five-member advi-
sory committees. The public meetings of 
the full commission would merely be a 
2 
summary rubber-stamp of the privately 
formulated decisions. 
Such a caveat is not a hypothetical 
proposition; the use of subsidiary advi-
sory committees by local boards and 
commissions, and avoidance of public 
decisionmaking through the "less than a 
quorum" exception, is common. You see, 
gentle reader, our public officials do not 
generally embrace the light of public ex-
amination. Given the choice, many will 
avoid it. 
The fact that the Brown Act specific-
ally allows avoidance of notice and pub-
lic proceedings for a meeting of an ad-
visory committee of a local entity where 
there is "less than a quorum" present 
does have one palliating aspect: the fact 
that the Bagley-Keene Act specifically 
does not have that provision. Further, the 
Bagley-Keene Act was amended such 
that its open meeting requirement explic-
itly applies to all subsets of "state bod-
ies" except advisory committees consist-
ing of less than three persons. 
Or does it? Well, one would think so. 
The Bagley-Keene Act was broadly 
drafted to apply liberally to state boards, 
committees, subcommittees, delegated 
bodies, surrogate bodies, inter-agency 
bodies, advisory bodies, and the whole 
host of governmental structures inevita-
bly created to avoid it.7 In the Brown 
Act, however, we have a similar statute 
which specifically allows an advisory 
committee consisting of less than a quo-
rum of a local entity to more liberally 
avoid the law. Application of the most 
basic rule of statutory interpretation8 tells 
us that the legislature's failure to replicate 
that provision in the Bagley-Keene Act 
confirms its intent to require open meet-
ings of all "state bodies" covered by the 
statute. If the legislature includes "x" in 
one statute and does not include it in a sep-
arate but otherwise similar statute, we can 
fairly assume that the intent is to .. .include 
"x" in one and not in the other. This is 
called reading the statute. 
But, wait a minute. A certain legal of-
fice has opined differently. The Office of 
the Attorney General of the State of Cal-
ifornia has published a "booklet"9 (not a 
formal opinion) in which a line deputy 
AG has fantasized that the Brown Act's 
"less than a quorum" exception reserved 
for advisory committees of local "legis-
lative bodies" applies equally to the 
"state bodies" covered by the Bagley-
Keene Act. 10 Where did he get this the-
ory? Good question. Not from the stat-
ute. Not from any published case. Not 
yet-but they're working on it, as we de-
scribe below. 
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A History of Legerdemain by the 
Attorney General's Office 
Let's be absolutely clear on the gen-
esis and chronology of the "less than a 
quorum" exception. The Brown Act was 
enacted in the Government Code in 
I 953; the Bagley-Keene Act was added 
in I 967. As enacted, neither contained 
any such exception. The AG's Office 
originally invented the "less than a quo-
rum" exception to the Brown Act in a 
formal Attornet General's Opinion pub-
lished in 1958. 1 Referring to the Brown 
Act as the "secret meeting act" [sic], the 
AG noted that the statute applied only to 
a "legislative body," then defined as "the 
governing board, commission, directors, 
or body of a local agency, or any board 
or commission thereof." The Attorney 
General distinguished the "legislative 
body" from committees thereof, and con-
cluded that "only meetings of the legis-
lative body of a local agency are re-
quired to be open and public." 12 With 
regard to committees of a local legisla-
tive body, the AG opined that "meetings 
of committees of local agencies where 
such committees consist of less than a 
quorum of the members of the legislative 
body are not covered by the act." 13 The 
AG's office reached this conclusion de-
spite its recitation of the well-known leg-
islative intent language contained within 
the Brown "secret meeting law."14 
In 1967, the legislature enacted the 
Bagley-Keene Act applicable to state 
bodies. In spite of the Attorney General's 
"longstanding administrative interpreta-
tion" of the similar Brown Act, the 
legislature did not see fit to include a 
"less than a quorum" exception in the 
Bagley-Keene Act. Other than the ex-
empt topics of discussion contained in 
Government Code section 11126, all 
meetings of all entities qualifying as 
"state bodies" under the Act were re-
quired to be held in public. 
In 1968, the legislature codified the 
"less than a quorum" exception-origi-
nated by the Attorney General's prema-
ture interpretation-into the Brown Act 
at Government Code section 54952.3. 
That section provided then-and still 
does today-that the term "[l]egislative 
body as defined in this section does not 
include a committee composed solely of 
members of the governing body of a 
local agency which are less than a quo-
rum of such governing body."15 Note the 
italicized limitation: The section pertains 
only to "advisory committees" of legis-
lative bodies. By its own terms, the 
"less than a quorum" exception is in-
applicable to local legislative bodies or 
subsets thereof which are other than 
advisory in nature. And note: While the 
legislature codified the AG's "less than 
a quorum" exception into the Brown Act, 
it failed to do so for the similar Bagley-
Keene Act. 
However, from the late 1960s until 
the present, the Attorney General's Of-
fice has continued its assault on the lan-
guage of the Brown Act, and also per-
formed its prestidigitation on the Bagley-
Keene Act. Regarding the Brown Act, it 
opined in a series of internal, informal 
letters that the "less than a quorum" ex-
ception applies not only to advisory 
committees as confined in section 
54952.3, but to other "legislative bodies" 
defined in section 54952. 16 These infor-
mal opinions cite the Office's self-cre-
ated exception and note its "longstanding 
existence" since 1958, ignoring the rel-
evant and substantive amendments to the 
Brown Act since that time, 17 including 
section 54952.3 noted above which con-
fined "less than a quorum" secret meet-
ings to advisory committees of local 
agencies under the Brown Act. 
In 1978, one court-Henderson v. 
Board of Education of the Couniy of Los 
Ange/es 18-considered a Brown Act 
challenge to private meetings held by a 
three-member advisory committee of a 
local seven-member board of education. 
Instead of simply citing section 54952.3 
(which had existed for ten years) and 
sending the plaintiff packing, the court 
launched into a spate of dicta including 
lengthy quotations from the AG's inter-
nal letters which-even post-section 
54952.3-continue to insist that the 
Brown Act "does not apply to meetings 
of committees of less than a quorum of 
the legislative body of the local 
agency"-without any limitation to ad-
visory committees as required by the 
statute. With much help from the AG's 
Office, this unfortunate dicta has taken 
on a life of its own. Relying on that 
dicta, the AG constantly cites Henderson 
as affirming its opinion that even non-
advisory, "less than a quorum" commit-
tees may meet in private. 19 In turn, local 
governments continue to violate the 
Brown Act, citing the AG's imprecise in-
terpretation of the Henderson dicta.20 
Then, having excessively shaded the 
sunshine law applicable to local agencies 
beyond "advisory committees," the At-
torney General began to engraft its "less 
than a quorum" Brown Act exception 
onto the Bagley-Keene Act applying to 
state agencies. As early as 1977, it infor-
mally opined that the exception a:fiplies 
equally to su_bsets of state bodies. 1 
In 1981, the legislature decided to 
California Regulatory Law Reporter• Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1992 
add a provision to the Bagley-Keene Act 
regarding advisory committees of state 
bodies. Did it adopt the 1977 AG's in-
formal opinion, evincing its agreement 
with it? No. Did it simply replicate the 
"less than a quorum" exception from the 
Brown Act's section 54952.3 applying to 
advisory committees of local legislative 
bodies? No. It enacted Government Code 
section 11121.8, which provides that 
even advisory committees of state bod-
ies, "if created by formal action of the 
state body or of any member of the state 
body, and if the advisory body so created 
consists of three or more persons," must 
meet in public. Thus, the legislature re-
jected the "less than a quorum" excep-
tion for state bodies in favor of a bright-
line test by explicit declaration. 
It is hard to imagine a clearer indica-
tion of the legislature's intent here. But 
the AG still doesn't get it-or pretends 
not to get it-because it continues to 
apply inapplicable Brown Act concepts 
rejected by the legislature in the Bagley-
Keene Act context, and specifically to 
opine that the "less than a quorum" ex-
ception applies to nonadvisory commit-
tees of state bodies. 22 
Unfortunately, this erroneous inter-
pretation has found its way into caselaw. 
In Funeral Security Plans, Inc. v. State 
Board of Funeral Directors and Em-
balmers, 3 the plaintiff-a funeral direc-
tor licensee of the Board-challenges 
numerous procedural improprieties it al-
leges the Board has committed, includ-
ing closed sessions of a Board advisory 
committee which plaintiff claims are un-
lawful under the Bagley-Keene Act. The 
committee at issue is comprised of two 
Board members; two staff members (the 
Board executive officer and an auditor) 
regularly attend meetings to assist the 
committee. If we were defending the 
Board, we'd simply argue that the com-
mittee is exempt from the public meeting 
provision of the Bagley-Keene Act be-
cause it's an advisory committee and it 
does not contain "three or more persons" 
under Government Code section 11121.8. 
The AG's Office-which defends state 
agencies in litigation-made this argu-
ment, but went further. Unforgivably 
misleading the court by citing Brown Act 
cases, Brown Act AG opinions, and 
Brown Act concepts on an issue which 
is unambiguously addressed in the clear 
language of the Bagley-Keene Act, the 
Office argued that "[a]s long as a quo-
rum of the board is not involved, no 
'meeting' occurred" which was required 
to be conducted in public. 24 
In an unnecessarily deferential opin-
ion reminiscent of (and relying on) Hen-
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derson, the trial court actually bought 
this latter, untenable, and dangerous ar-
gument. The Sacramento County Supe-
rior Court held that although the lan-
guage of the Bagley-Keene Act might 
appear to compel the committee to hold 
public meetings,25 "an overriding princi-
ple applies" which permits the advisory 
committee to meet in closed session. Cit-
ing Henderson (an inapplicable Brown 
Act case), the court held that the "less 
than a quorum" exception "has been ap-
plied administratively for many years to 
state agencies operating under the 
Bagley-Keene Act as well. See Open 
Meeting Laws (1989), California Attor-
ney General's Office .... Since the Act has 
been amended several times without dis-
turbing this long-standing administrative 
interpretation, this exception is entitled 
to respect and, unless clearly erroneous, 
should be followed. "26 This holding, of 
course, is correct under Government 
Code section 11121 .8; the tortured rea-
soning the court used to get there, led 
by our AG's Office, is erroneous. This 
regrettable decision reflects the overrid-
ing deference paid to executive agencies 
and their counsel by many California 
courts. The case is now pending before 
the Third District Court of Appeal. 
In addition to Funeral Security Plans, 
a second case involving the Attorney 
General's interpretation of the "less than 
a quorum" exception is pending; the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court recently granted 
review in Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Orange County Employees Retirement 
System Board of Directors.27 Here, the 
respondent local government is advanc-
ing the Attorney General's anti-demo-
cratic and-perhaps more troubling-in-
tellectually dishonest arguments. In 
Freedom Newspapers, the Court has be-
fore it an appellate court decision which 
carefully traces the relevant history of 
the Brown Act. Based upon that legisla-
tive history and the actual, operative lan-
guage of the Brown Act, the court ruled 
that meetings of four-member commit-
tees of a nine-member local body must 
be held in public, because the commit-
tees meet the current definition of "leg-
islative body" contained in Government 
Code section 54952. The court of appeal 
rejected the flawed analysis of Hender-
son and its citation of informal Attorney 
General "indexed letters," commenting 
that reliance on unpublished letters of the 
AG's Office is "somewhat like relying 
on a treatise that itself relies on a non-
published opinion of the Court of Appeal 
and does not explain the rationale of the 
non published opinion .... We decline in 
this opinion to join this circle of error. 
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While we agree that courts should give 
great weight to the published opinions of 
the Attorney General, they are not bound 
to perpetuate obvious errors in non-
published indexed letters."28 
The AG's continuing and insistent in-
terpretation of these two statutes implies 
that (I) state and local boards and com-
missions may create committees which 
have binding decisionmaking authority, 
and (2) these committees may meet in 
private so long as they comprise less 
than a quorum of the board or commis-
sion which created them. This interpre-
tation is absolutely contrary to the intent, 
spirit, and language of both statutes. 
Hopefully, both the court of appeal re-
viewing the superior court's servile de-
cision in Funeral Security Plans and the 
Supreme Court reviewing the correct 
analysis of the court of appeal in Free-
dom Newspapers will focus on the un-
ambiguous words and intent of the 
legislature, and conclude that there is no 
such thing as a "nonadvisory commit-
tee" which is permitted to meet in pri-
vate, either under Brown Act section 
S49S2 or Bagley-Keene Act sections 
11121-11121.7. Only "advisory com-
mittees" may meet in private, and then 
only if they comprise less than a quo-
rum of a local legislative body under 
the Brown Act or less than three mem-
bers of a state body under the Bagley-
Keene Act. All other conceivable subsets 
of state and local agencies are required 
to meet in public, unless their. topic of 
conversation satisfies one of the subject-
matter exemptions. 
We do not urge this position on the 
basis of the underlying policy-conced-
ing that it represents our preference-but 
from the application of the most basic 
rules of legislative interpretation. Here, 
it consists of simply reading the statute, 
and honestly attempting to apply its fa-
cial and unambiguous meaning. It is dif-
ficult to read the briefs in these two 
cases-in both, the respondents rely on 
the opinions of an office funded by The 
People and obliged above all others to 
maintain exemplary standards, including 
some measure of intellectual integrity. It 
does not lessen our distress that the ar-
guments are offered in order to advance 
a position antithetical to legislative intent 
and democratic values. 
The Genesis of the Problem: 
The Acculturation of 
Deputy Attorneys General 
The conflict problem confronting the 
Attorney General is a conundrum. The 
Office is a special kind of attorney. First, 
the Office is the attorney of these state 
3 
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agencies. It represents them. [Query, 
how much weight should be given to the 
opinion of an attorney framed to the ad-
vantage of his client?] But at the same 
time, the Attorney General is the chief 
law enforcement officer of the state. This 
dualism creates many problems for the 
Office (problems which appear to war-
rant its constitutional division and re-
structuring). But it is reasonable to ex-
pect the chief law enforcement obliga-
tions of the Office to supersede the rep-
resentation of agencies. In fact, where 
legal counsel is performing in full ethical 
regalia, one does not have to be vested 
with special law enforcement status to 
tell a client: "That is wrong. You will 
not do that or you can get yourself an-
other attorney." 
Occasionally the Office of the Attor-
ney General will do that-usually if it is 
a political matter. But when agencies are 
just wrong on the law and refuse to fol-
low sound advice, even where the results 
are cruel and abusive, our public attor-
neys all too often defend the bad rather 
than repair to higher ground. 
The reason has to do with the accul-
turation of attorney to client which im-
bues many of the regulatory agencies; 
these deputy attorneys general literally 
join the tribe. Adding to that problem is 
the "hired gun" ethic many attorneys 
mistakenly deduce from the moral rela-
tivism implicit in Socratic law school 
training (there is no right or wrong; just 
different arguments, all of which are 
flawed). The final result: I am a "profes-
sional," which means I am to maximize 
advantage for my client. I advise my cli-
ent in order to advance his or her inter-
ests and attempt to steer him away from 
the reefs and shoals his proposed actions 
might impose. I am "his" or "hers." 
Wrong, my brethren. Ideally, you are 
accountable too. And in a more demo-
cratic world, just as your public clients 
would shoulder the accountability they 
so assiduously avoid, so would you. 
How does one explain the Office of 
the Attorney General standing for the 
proposition that the most important stat-
ute in the Code defending democratic 
values and assuring public government 
is loopholed based on an interpretation 
fabricated out of thin air? Is there ac-
countability within the Office? Compe-
tence? Why doesn't the Office purge 
these obviously outmoded decisions now 
that they have been rejected by the 
legislature? 
If there is to be a response to the eter-
nal Archimedean search for honesty 
among our institutions, it must begin 
with the Office of the Attorney General. 
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Here is the proper repository of our high-
est standards: the chief law enforcement 
officer of our state. But thus far, this Of-
fice has attempted to block the light of 
California's most important sunshine laws. 
It has done so with "disingenuous anal-
ysis"-this is lawyerspeak for "lying." 
The development of the downward 
spiral on this important issue is not di-
rected from the top. It really has not mat-
tered who has been the Attorney Gen-
eral. These briefs and positions are not 
reviewed from an aspirational or even a 
generalist perspective. The inmates rule 
this part of the asylum. The civil service 
line deputies are "defending their agen-
cies," who want maximum secrecy and 
unfettered discretion. Creative arguments 
easily slide into error, usually through 
the process of half-truths. "I won't lie; 
I'll just state half of it. Then it's up to 
the other side to correct the record." 
As wrong as this assumption may be, 
it is particularly reprehensible for a pub-
lic official, and for this officer of the 
court. Contrary to some perceptions, the 
public prosecutor has a special duty to 
the truth; for example, he or she does 
not seek to convict, but to determine the 
truth, and to help produce even-handed 
justice. The credibility of public agencies 
to the public, and to the courts reviewing 
the prosecutor's contentions, properly 
depends upon their fealty to higher du-
ties, not to procuring an advantage for a 
client agency. In this case, the Attorney 
General's course of action in seeking 
such advantage comes at a heavy price; 
it seeks to create by judicial holding un-
enacted loopholes to allow common 
avoidance of our most important sun-
shine statute, the procedural underpin-
ning for open government, the condition 
precedent to our precious democracy. 
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